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Sex-Based Discrimination in the American 
Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition Against 
Gender Stereotyping 
Serafina Raskin∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While it is no longer a contentious fact that discrimination on the basis 
of sex is an all too frequent occurrence in the American workplace, the 
question that has become more pressing is what exactly constitutes sex dis-
crimination?1  Grooming and other appearance based standards have long 
been tolerated under the auspices of “managerial discretion” or a business’ 
attempt to establish a corporate image, attract customers, or ensure health 
and safety standards are met.  Yet, today’s employees are taking a stance 
against those employers who fail to address equality concerns with regard 
to appearance and/or dress codes.  This Note focuses on the way that exist-
ing conceptions of American sex discrimination law fail to meet the chang-
ing forms of sexual discrimination in the workplace.  By focusing on a 
feminist critique of the developing case law surrounding workplace appear-
ance rules, this note attempts to develop a more complete understanding of 
the damage that “sex appropriate” or “sex specific” dress codes do to both 
the female and male workforce.  The final part of this Note addresses the 
way in which localities have attempted to legislate in the area of appear-
ance and dress, and asks whether such legislation will be able to force em-
ployers to change basic cultural expectations about gender. 
                                                          ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; 
B.A., cum laude, 2002, University of California, Irvine. I would like to thank Professor Jo-
seph Grodin, Professor Joan Williams, and the editorial board and staff of the Hastings 
Women’s Law Journal. 
1.  See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (E.D.Wash., 2001) 
(“the goal of Title VII was to end years of discrimination in employment and to place all 
men and women, regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin, on equal footing in 
how they were treated in the workforce.”). 
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II.  TITLE VII AND DRESS, GROOMING, AND APPEARANCE-
BASED RULES 
The vast majority of the American workforce must adhere to employer-
created policies that establish minimum standards of personal appearance 
for employees while at work.  While most employees unquestioningly ac-
cept the legitimacy of the employer rules regarding appearance, other em-
ployees have mounted sex discrimination challenges in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (or a state’s equivalent).2  Unfortu-
nately, American courts have consistently rejected challenges to employer 
rules and informal practices regarding employee workplace attire, groom-
ing standards, and personal appearance.  Instead, courts have been deferen-
tial to employer business judgment, stressing the importance of allowing 
companies to regulate their employees in order to project a professional 
image when representing the company and its interests.3  This view is ex-
pressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 
 
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a 
company’s place in public estimation. That the image created by 
its employees dealing with the public when on company assign-
ment affects its relations is so well known that we may take judi-
cial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favorable 
acceptance.4 
 
Although courts give employers wide latitude in formulating dress 
codes, employees are challenging these codes with increasing vigor and 
frequency.5  A basic review of Title VII challenges to appearance based 
rules demonstrates that employee challenges tend to fall into two types of 
fact patterns: “(1) challenges to employer dress or grooming codes that are 
based on gender-linked assumptions and community norms regarding ap-
propriate appearance or attire for men and women and (2) challenges to 
employer decisions to employ or retain only employees who have an ‘at-
tractive’ appearance.”6 
                                                          
2.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, provides in pertinent 
part: “(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to 
hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s . . . sex . . .”  Furthermore, Title VII itself allows an exception to the rule 
against discrimination on the basis of sex, if the employer can prove that sex is a bona fide 
occupational qualification (“BFOQ”). 
3.  See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1987); Woods v. Safe-
way Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Cal. 1976). 
4.  Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
5.  See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977); Cloutier v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 311 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2004). 
6. DIANNE AVERY & ROBERT BELTON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE, 331 (West Group Publishing 1999) (1971), 
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A.  CHALLENGES BASED ON COMMUNITY NORMS AND GENDER-BASED 
ASSUMPTIONS 
In the first category of cases, courts have upheld employers’ use of per-
sonal appearance policies as a legitimate tool to promote a company’s im-
age.  In Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange,7 an employee was ter-
minated for failing to comply with the company hair length policy.  He 
challenged his termination, claiming that the policy restricting hair length 
for male employees but imposing no similar restriction on female employ-
ees discriminates in violation of Title VII.8  The court observed that of the 
six federal courts of appeal that have considered the issue, all have agreed 
that a policy requiring men and not women to wear their hair short does not 
violate Title VII.9 
The court concluded that a policy that requires one sex to wear its hair 
shorter than the other sex is not unlawful merely because it treats men and 
women differently.10  The court relied on a series of cases upholding 
grooming and dress codes based on gender.11  Specifically, in finding a de 
minimus impact on employees’ working conditions, the court relied on the 
reasoning in Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., where the D.C. Circuit Court 
found that “Title VII was never intended to encompass sexual classifica-
tions having only an insignificant effect on employment opportunities.”12  
Furthermore, other courts had reasoned that hair length policies do not fall 
within the statutory goal of equal employment sought to be remedied by 
Title VII.13  For example, the court in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph 
Publishing Co., found that an employee’s length of hair “is related more 
closely to an employer’s choice of how to run his business than to ensuring 
equality of employment opportunity.”14  Other courts have accepted the ar-
gument that the only way to be “gender neutral” is to adopt disparate rules 
that reflect “the standard of what the community expects of each sex, re-
spectively.”15  Under such reasoning, employers typically may impose ap-
                                                                                                                                      
discussing Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1414-25 (1992). 
7.  Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996). 
8.  Id. at 908. 
9.  Id. at 908 (citing Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976)); 
see Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Cont’l South-
eastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Knott v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1092 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
10.  Tavora, 101 F. 3d at 908. 
11.  See, e.g., Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wil-
lingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975). 
12.  Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1191. 
15.  Klare, supra note 6, at 1419. 
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pearance standards that have a foundation in social norms, such as prohibit-
ing tattoos, body piercings, or earrings for men, and requiring the wearing 
of make-up and high heeled shoes for women.16 
In Tavora, the employee-plaintiff claimed that the above mentioned 
cases were no longer good law by relying on cases where courts found 
gender-based discrimination unlawful.17  Specifically, the plaintiff relied on 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, and City of Los An-
geles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart.18  In Newport News, the 
Court found a health benefit policy discriminatory that provided lesser 
benefits for pregnancy-related services to male employees than it provided 
to female employees.19  The Court stated, “[s]uch a practice would not pass 
the simple test of Title VII discrimination that we enunciated in Los Ange-
les Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, for it would treat a male employee 
with dependents ‘in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be dif-
ferent.’”20 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Manhart held that an employer may not use 
the fact that females, as a group, live longer than males to justify a policy 
of requiring larger contributions by females into a pension plan to receive 
the same monthly pension benefits when they retire.21  In finding that such 
plans were unlawful, the Court stated, “[i]t is now well recognized that em-
ployment decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions 
about the characteristics of males or females.”22  The Court further ex-
plained that “[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient 
reason for [discrimination].”23 
In Tavora, the plaintiff relied on Manhart and Newport News to argue 
that Title VII applies to any employment policy with any difference be-
tween men and women, no matter how trivial.24  Specifically, plaintiff ar-
gued that the “but for” test enunciated in Manhart and Newport News, 
combined with the Supreme Court’s broad prophylactic language intended 
to eradicate gender-based discrimination, overruled the courts of appeals’ 
cases cited above.25  The court disagreed with Tavora’s reading of Manhart 
                                                          
16.  See, e.g., Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1117 n.3 (“reasonable regulations prescribing good 
grooming standards are not at all uncommon in the business world, indeed, taking account 
of basic differences in male and female physiques and common differences in customary 
dress of male and female employees, it is not usually thought that there is unlawful dis-
crimination ‘because of sex’”). 
17.  Tavora, 101 F. 3d at 908. 
18.  See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); 
City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
19.  Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676. 
20.  Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908 (citing Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676). 
21.  Manhart, 462 U.S. 702. 
22.  Id. at 709. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908. 
25.  Id. 
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and Newport News.26  The court differentiated the cases cited by the em-
ployee, finding that the policies resulting in disparate levels of pension and 
health benefits for males and females are factually different from the 
grooming policy at hand.27  The court reasoned that a policy which requires 
males to wear their hair shorter than females is not unlawful merely be-
cause it treats males and females differently, rather the policy is not unlaw-
ful because it is trivial in nature.28 
Based on the court’s reasoning in this case, challenges to employer’s 
appearance and grooming policies must demonstrate more than a de mini-
mus impact on employees.  Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Chicago, is a leading case striking down an employer’s 
dress code which required female office and managerial employees to wear 
employer supplied uniforms. 29  The cost of the two-piece, color coordi-
nated uniforms was treated as additional income.30  Male employees at the 
company were required to wear “customary business attire,” consisting of a 
“suit, a sport jacket and pants, or even a ‘leisure suit,’ as long as it [was] 
worn with a shirt and tie.”31 
The company justified its sex-based uniform rules on two bases: first, 
the bank feared that if it did not impose a uniform on female employees, 
these women would engage in “dress competition,” and second, that if the 
women were allowed to exercise their own judgment in clothing, the 
women would “follow the fashion” instead of wearing work appropriate 
clothing.32  In striking down the company dress code the court found that 
the company’s justifications “reveal that it is based on offensive stereo-
                                                          
26.  Id. 
27.  Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908-09 (“We believe that Tavora’s argument fails to consider 
the factual context of those decisions, namely employment policies resulting in significantly 
different levels of pension and health benefits for males and females.”).  See also Harper v. 
Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing on similar 
grounds: 
The Newport News and Manhart plaintiffs could not avoid the effects of the discrimi-
natory policies; they received lesser benefits simply because of their sex.  Because the dis-
criminatory policies in those cases were aimed at a single immutable characteristic — the 
plaintiffs’ sex — a simple “but for” test effectively identified forbidden discrimination.  In 
contrast, the alleged discrimination at issue in Willingham was between members of the 
same sex based on the neutral characteristic of hair length. The Willingham plaintiff was 
denied employment because he chose not to cut his hair; however, males in general were not 
prohibited from working for the defendant.  Consequently, applying the “but-for” test from 
Newport News and Manhart to a Willingham-type situation does not effectively identify for-
bidden discrimination, i.e., discrimination that deprives members of a given sex of equal 
employment opportunity. The “but-for” test is appropriate only where alleged discrimina-
tion is based on sex alone.  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s use of that test in Newport News 
and Manhart does not affect the analysis or conclusions of the Willingham Court). 
28.  Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908. 
29.  Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
30.  Id. at 1030. 
31.  Id. at 1029. 
32.  Id. at 1033. 
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types prohibited by Title VII.”33  Furthermore, the court found that: 
 
Two sets of employees performing the same functions are 
subjected on the basis of sex to two entirely separate dress codes 
— one including a variety of normal business attire and the other 
requiring a clearly identifiable uniform.  This different treatment 
in the conditions of employment for female employees cannot be 
justified by business necessity, since . . . the employer had a va-
riety of nondiscriminatory means of assuring good grooming.34 
 
The court held that the employer’s policy violated Title VII because as 
a result of the policy, female employees were subject to a lower profes-
sional status, and therefore were the victims of disparate treatment based 
upon sex.35  “[W]hile there is nothing offensive about uniforms per se, 
when some employees are uniformed and others are not there is a natural 
tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser professional 
status than their male colleagues . . .”36  Currently, a number of workplace 
personal appearance rules are being challenged as violative of Title VII.37  
The differing opinions by the circuits make it likely that the Supreme Court 
will make a definitive ruling on the degree of deference afforded to em-
ployers in enforcing workplace grooming standards in the near future. 
B.   DETERMINING THE “HOTNESS” FACTOR IN A “FACIALLY NEUTRAL” 
MANNER 
The second type of Title VII challenges deals with hiring or employ-
ment requirements which may be “facially neutral” but may act as a barrier 
to hiring or promotion.  On their face such requirements may appear to 
harm men and women equally and thus are not discriminatory.  However, 
much empirical data has come forward showing that appearance standards 
are not applied equally and that women’s appearances are scrutinized much 
more than men’s appearances.38  Furthermore, such “neutral policies” have 
been accused of perpetuating arcane stereotypes about both men and 
women.39 
The Eighth Circuit confronted these issues in Craft v. Metromedia, 
Inc.40  There, the plaintiff, Christine Craft, was demoted from co-anchor to 
reporter by the Kansas City, Missouri station (KMBC-TV), as a result of 
                                                          
33.  Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033. 
34.  Id. at 1032. 
35.  Id. at 1032-33. 
36.  Id. at 1033. 
37.  See, e.g., Harper, 139 F.3d at 1385. 
38.  See AVERY & BELTON, supra note 6, at 333-37. 
39.  See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. 702; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989). 
40.  Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1058 (1986). 
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focus group studies and telephone polls which were “overwhelmingly 
negative” toward the plaintiff’s appearance and showed that Craft lagged 
behind her peers in “good looks.”41  Craft challenged her demotion alleging 
that different standards of appearance were imposed on her than upon her 
male coworkers.42  The court of appeals acknowledged that: 
 
Evidence showed a particular concern with appearance in 
television; the district court stated that reasonable appearance re-
quirements were ‘obviously critical’ to KMBC’s economic well-
being; and even Craft admitted she recognized that television 
was a visual medium and that on-air personnel would need to 
wear appropriate clothes and makeup. . . .  While we believe the 
record shows an overemphasis by KMBC on appearance, we are 
not the proper forum in which to debate the relationship between 
newsgathering and dissemination and considerations of appear-
ance and presentation — i.e., questions of substance versus im-
age — in television journalism.43  
 
Although the court recognized that KMBC imposed gender-specific 
fashion requirements, the court approved such requirements as a business 
necessity by relying upon focus group and telephone survey results.44  The 
court’s opinion suggests that employers who wish to base hiring decisions 
on the appearance or attractiveness of applicants would be wise to validate 
such criteria empirically with consumer and market research. 
While the court in Craft failed to find a violation of Title VII, other 
courts have found violations where employer dress codes promote demean-
ing stereotypes of female characteristics and abilities or stereotypical no-
tions of female attractiveness or use of female sexuality to attract busi-
ness.45  For example, in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., plaintiff Margaret 
                                                          
41.  Id. at 1209. 
42.  Id. at 1207. 
43.  Id. at 1215. 
44.  Id.  The Court explained that: While there may have been some emphasis on the 
feminine stereotype of “softness” and bows and ruffles and on the fashionableness of female 
anchors, the evidence suggests such concerns were incidental to a true focus on consistency 
of appearance, proper coordination of colors and textures, the effects of studio lighting on 
clothing and makeup, and the greater degree of conservatism thought necessary in the Kan-
sas City market. The “dos” and “don’ts” for female anchors addressed the need to avoid, for 
example, tight sweaters or overly “sexy” clothing and extreme “high fashion” or “sporty” 
outfits while the male “dos” and “don’ts” similarly cautioned against “frivolous” colors and 
“extreme” textures and styles as damaging to the “authority” of newscasters. These criteria 
do not implicate the primary thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt employers to “discard 
outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment disadvantages for one sex.”  See 
Knott v. Missouri P. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975); see generally Patti Buch-
man, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen on the Basis of 
Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 201 (1985). 
45.  See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (up-
holding weight requirements for female flight attendants to ensure slenderness), cert. dis-
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Hasselman was hired as an office building lobby attendant.46  She was fired 
for refusing to wear a “Bicentennial uniform” which was an improperly 
small uniform exposing her thighs, midriff and portion of her buttocks.47  
Hasselman was subjected to public comments from guests entering and ex-
iting the building regarding the uniform and she received “a number of 
sexual propositions and endured lewd comments and gestures.”48  The 
court stated that by requiring the plaintiff to wear the uniform, “defendants 
made her acquiescence in sexual harassment by the public, and perhaps by 
building tenants, a prerequisite of her employment as a lobby attendant.”49  
The court held that the wearing of this uniform on the job, exposing the 
plaintiff to sexual harassment, constituted sex discrimination and ruled that 
on the present facts, “it is beyond dispute that the wearing of sexually re- 
vealing garments does not constitute a [bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion].”50 
A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has limited the 
scope of Title VII sex discrimination claims.51  Specifically, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court held that Harrah’s workplace appearance rules, although they 
adopted different appearance standards based on sex, did not constitute dis-
parate treatment sex discrimination under Title VII because the rules did 
not create unequal burdens for men and women.52  This ruling deviates 
from the somewhat liberal Ninth Circuit trend in expanding causes of ac-
tion under Title VII and stirs ever-increasing feminist concerns about the 
level of discretion granted to management to require females to conform to 
images of “appropriate femininity.” 
 
                                                                                                                                      
missed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 439 n. 24 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy where female cabin attendants were forbidden to wear eye-
glasses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).  Cf. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. 
Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting flight attendant position limited to females by em-
ployer who merely wished to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool to attract custom-
ers and ensure profitability). 
46.  EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  The em-
ployee’s job description consisted of performing “security, safety, maintenance and infor-
mational functions.” 
47.  Id. at 604. 
48.  Id. at 605. 
49.  Id. at 609-10. 
50.  Id. at 611. 
51.  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002) (reject-
ing Jespersen’s argument that customer preferences, presumed or actual, could not justify 
otherwise unlawful sex discrimination). 
52.  Id. (finding that the female plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Harrah’s make-up 
requirement for women imposed a burden in excess of that associated with normal good-
grooming standards). 
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III. FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE: DEFINING THE 
DISCRIMINATORY ACT 
In deciding sex discrimination cases under Title VII the courts have 
consistently asked whether differential rules are imposed on men and 
women.53  The “difference” factor that the courts have adopted must meet a 
heavy burden.54  Whereas in Price Waterhouse, the United States Supreme 
Court has clearly held that employers may not lawfully base employment 
decisions on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes,55 federal and state 
courts are hesitant to extend the logic to grooming and appearance based 
rules.56 
The courts have consistently failed to find discrimination where the dif-
ference is merely “de minimus” (where the rules imposed are not signifi-
cantly more restrictive on one sex over another), where the grooming or 
appearance based discrimination is a business necessity or BFOQ, or where 
the employer’s policies are based on pervasive “community expectations” 
or stereotypes.  The first part of this analysis addressed the shortcomings of 
the courts in relying on the aforementioned reasoning in failing to find dis-
crimination.  I argue that the failure of the legislators, courts and employers 
is in the acceptance of gender based stereotypes as legitimate in the context 
of appearance and grooming based standards.  Furthermore, by treating 
such stereotypes as legitimate and worthy of deference, courts relieve em-
ployers of the burden of defying social norms. 
A.  DE MINIMUS IMPACT: THE BURDEN OF LIPSTICK 
When Darlene Jespersen was fired from the Reno Harrah’s casino after 
refusing to wear make-up as required by a new grooming code, called the 
“Personal Best”57 program, she filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim 
against Harrah’s.58  The lawsuit claimed that Harrah’s had violated Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in employment59 by firing her for 
defying a requirement that it imposed only on women.60  Harrah’s defended 
its “Personal Best” program61 arguing that the program imposed similar 
                                                          
53.  Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907. 
54.  Id. (finding that de minimus impact on employment was not unlawful). 
55.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
56.  See Tavora, 101 F.3d 907. 
57.  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). In 
addition to make-up Harrah’s “Personal Best” program required all women in the beverage 
department to style their hair, to wear nude or natural stockings, and to limit nail polish to 
clear, white, pink or red color only.  Under the policy male workers were forbidden to wear 
make-up, ponytails or hair below the top of their shirt collar. 
58.  Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
59.  Amici briefs in support of Jespersen were filed by the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Nevada, Northwest Women’s Law Center and California Women’s Law Center. 
60.  Id. at 1193. 
61.  On Harrah’s side were amici briefs from American Hotel & Lodging Association 
and the California Hotel & Lodging Association. 
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burdens on both men and women and was not overly burdensome.62  After 
all, a Harrah’s representative postured: “[Jespersen is] only one person 
among 4200 employees that ha[s] complained about our policy.”63 
The federal district court, surprisingly, agreed with the lower court and 
granted summary judgment to the casino.64  Title VII was not meant to ap-
ply to appearance codes, the court reasoned, and even if it did, this was not 
unlawful discrimination because the burdens imposed on men and women 
were equal.65  Women were required to wear make-up, he said, but men 
were forbidden to, and that could be as much of a burden on a man who 
wanted to wear cosmetics as it was for a woman like Jespersen who did not 
want to wear make-up but was forced to do so.66 
I argue that the equal or de minimus burdens arguments are illegitimate.  
First, courts are not in a position to decide what impact is in fact de mini-
mus.  In sexual harassment case law, the courts apply a “reasonable 
woman” standard from the perspective of the plaintiff.67  Such a perspec-
tive is preferable because it recognizes that men and women would have 
“different perspectives,” that is, where a man may not be affected by cer-
tain behavior, a woman may find the behavior offensive.68  However, in 
appearance based discrimination claims, the courts have engaged in little or 
no comparative analysis of the burdens males and females, respectively, 
face.  Furthermore, in practice, some courts will dismiss challenges when 
employers show that requirements were imposed on both sexes, regardless 
of how burdensome or demeaning either set of requirements might be.69  
Such a focus on the comparative burden seems illogical because an em-
ployer’s policy will be found to be non discriminatory even though the pol-
icy is based on stereotypical notions of femininity or masculinity.  Carried 
to its extreme employers may be able to force women to wear only femi-
nine colors to work, as long as the company forced men to conform to an 
equally ridiculous stereotype of having to wear only masculine colors. 
Other courts have seemed to engage in a more qualitative review, im-
plying that the burdens on men and women must be at least roughly compa-
rable by some criterion or another.  However, are courts in the position to 
make such findings?  How does a court decide whether a requirement that a 
                                                          
62.  Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. 
63.  Peter Schelden, Appeals Court to Hear Harrah’s Gender Discrimination Case, 
Daily Sparks Tribune, Dec. 2, 2003, available at http://www.nevadalabor.com/ barbwire/ 
barb03/tribjespg616.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
64.  Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
65.  Id. at 1193. 
66.  Id. 
67.  See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (evaluating objective 
hostility from the perspective of the victim). 
68.  Id. at 878. 
69. Christine A. Littleton, Working Women: Thank You, You’re Unwelcome, 19 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 299, 304 (2004) (reviewing DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004)). 
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man wear a tie and collar to work, or that he dress in “appropriate business 
attire” is comparable to a woman having to wear heels70 or make-up to 
work?  Should the court focus on the amount of time it takes for a man to 
put on a tie versus the amount of time it takes a woman to apply make-up 
and put on pantyhose?  If not, should the courts focus on the cost of pur-
chasing ties compared to the cost of purchasing pantyhose?71  What about 
the relative discomfort level of a woman forced to wear high heeled shoes, 
compared to a man having to wear a collar and tie?  Such an analysis seems 
both absurd and yet relevant.  If a court is going to judge that the standards 
applied to men and women are roughly equal, must it not engage in a “fact 
finding” investigation?  Obviously, such an investigation would lead to un-
reasonable consequences, such as having to poll men about the discomfort 
level associated with wearing a tie and compare that discomfort level to 
that of a poll of women wearing make-up, heels, stockings, etc.  No two 
plaintiffs are alike.  As in sexual harassment cases, which are judged from 
the perspective of the reasonable plaintiff, the courts should focus on the 
perspective of the plaintiff in judging the relative negative employment 
consequences of its disparate policies. 
For example, Darlene Jespersen was deeply disturbed by Harrah’s pol-
icy.72  In an interview with the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition Jesper-
sen was asked about how she felt about Harrah’s policy and how the policy 
impacted her work.  Jespersen described her reaction to the company pol-
icy: 
 
I felt I had to [wear make-up]. I tried it for a couple of 
weeks, I went and bought the make-up, and then I just stopped 
doing it. . . . It was real degrading, degrading to be told you have 
to go see this guy. I had never worn make-up. I said I would 
never allow myself to be humiliated like that again. I got really 
stressed over it . . . it was upsetting. When I went to apply for a 
job, I did not think about make-up. It should be just the fact that 
you are a good worker, not that you have to paint your face. But, 
                                                          
70.  Jennifer Wilder, High Heels Take a Toll on Women’s Knees, DrDonnica.com, May 
13, 2004, http://www.drdonnica.com/news/00008550.htm.  “High-heel shoes seem to be 
wreaking havoc on the joints of women everywhere . . .[o]steoarthritis [often caused by 
high-heeled shoes] is the most common type of arthritis and is seen more often in women 
than in men.”  
71.  Any woman who has worn pantyhose on a regular basis knows how difficult it is 
to keep them from ripping or snagging.  When I worked as a waitress at Coco’s Restaurant 
and Bakery all women employees who chose to wear skirts to work were required to wear 
nude colored stockings.  I had a hard time wearing the stockings more than one time without 
ripping them.  It cost me approximately $3.00 for every new pair of stockings.  My wage, 
however, was $5.75 an hour plus tips. 
72.  GenderPAC Interviews Darlene Jespersen on Gender, Being Fired, and Sex 
Stereotyping in the Workplace, Jan. 17, 2001, http://www.gpac.org/archive/ news/notitle.ht 
ml?cmd=view&msgnum=0273 (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
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I thought the first time I had to do it because I thought I would 
lose my job. After doing it for a couple of weeks, my feelings 
became more important than losing my job. My happiness be-
came more important . . . The supervisor said this was a corpo-
rate decision. I said this has nothing to do with my job, and I’m 
not doing it. It’s degrading. I said, I’m 44 years old and I’m tired 
of being told how to look and dress. I’m tired and I’m not doing 
it, not after you let me do this for 20 years. I could tell the super-
visor was concerned about my job.73 
 
Darlene Jespersen preferred to lose her job rather than undergo the hu-
miliation of being forced to wear make-up on a daily basis.74  Her experi-
ence is not unique.  Many women feel dehumanized, awkward and uncom-
fortable in make-up, high-heeled shoes, or skirts.  Studies show that 
women’s experience in relation to their physical appearance and their bod-
ies is different from that of a man.75  Women’s opinions of their bodies is a 
complex manifestation of both external and internalized sexism.76  As a re-
sult of the sexist messages directed at them as well as those absorbed by the 
culture, women feel devalued and hypersensitive about their self-image.77  
Women’s obsession and distorted attention to their bodies are not un-
founded.  “Studies show that women are judged more harshly than men 
when they deviate from dominant social standards of attractiveness.”78  For 
many women “[b]y adulthood, the habit of fixating on their perceived im-
perfections has become a permanent way of life; women check mirrors 
constantly, they diet,79 they compare themselves to other women, they con-
template cosmetic surgery.” 
Anne Bottomley describes the way many women feel about their bod-
ies in Many Appearances of the Body in Feminist Scholarship.80  “For 
many of us, as women, the experience of being objectified led to a sense of 
                                                          
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  See, e.g., SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT, FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, 
AND THE BODY 166, 329 (University of California Press, 1993) (citing Daniel Goleman, Dis-
like of Own Bodies Found Common Among Women, N. Y. Times, March 19, 1985, at C1.).  
The study confirms that there is a large gap between the percentages of women who are pre-
occupied with their appearance, as compared to men.  Research conducted at the University 
of Pennsylvania in 1985 found men to be generally satisfied with their appearance, often, in 
fact, “distorting their perceptions in a positive, self-aggrandizing way.”  
76.  HOPE LANDRINE & ELIZABETH A. KLONOFF, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: 
PREVALENCE, CONSEQUENCES, REMEDIES 138-39 (Sage Publications, 1997). 
77.  Id. at 138. 
78.  BORDO, supra note 75, at 329. 
79.  Id. (citing PAUL GARFINKEL AND DAVID GARNER, ANOREXIA NERVOSA: A 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE 112-13 (1982)).  It is estimated that close to 90 percent of 
all anorexics are female.  Id. 
80.  ANNE BOTTOMLEY, THE MANY APPEARANCES OF THE BODY IN FEMINIST 
SCHOLARSHIP, IN BODY LORE AND LAWS 127, (Andrew Bainham et al. eds., 2002). 
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dispossession of our bodies.”81  As a result of this objectification, “we [as 
women] experience a sense of intrusion, lack of control and being sub-
jected to the ‘gaze’.”82  Women become paralyzed, not knowing whether 
we should take pleasure in our bodies and their beauty.  How do we do this 
when we are being “required to conform to body images that fractured and 
violated our sense of what it could/should mean to be a woman”?83 
The reality that women live in is very different than that of men.  In 
fact, it is different from woman to woman.  Not all women are self-critical 
about their bodies.  But, many women are.  How can a court look at Dar-
lene Jespersen and say that having to wear make-up, style her hair, wear 
stockings, and nail polish only has a de minimus impact on her work envi-
ronment? 
It is also apparent that sex discrimination is no longer a predominantly 
female concern.  A policy that requires men to conform to a certain image 
of masculinity can be said to be equally restrictive.  Again, in Tavora the 
court found that the impact of a restrictive hair length requirement on the 
male plaintiff was minimal, however, such discrimination against a male 
employee not only affects other male employees who feel they have to con-
form to a certain image of masculinity, but is also damaging to women in a 
less obvious way.  When employers stigmatize men for displaying female 
qualities, and/or force men to reject such displays of “femininity” as wear-
ing an earring or having long hair, it can be seen as an indirect assault on 
female employees.  In a sense, what the employer has done is ranked dis-
plays of femininity on a lower tier.  It follows then that those who display 
feminine qualities become a part of the lower class employees themselves.  
When men are precluded from displaying those feminine characteristics it 
is women who are left to feel the stigma of their traits. 
B.  MAKE-UP TO TRANSFORM RENO INTO VEGAS 
It is well known that competition among gaming establishments is 
fierce.84  In fact, according to several academics within the gaming estab-
lishment, “[t]here is constant pressure to find that certain niche, image, or 
theme that will set a gaming establishment apart from the others.”85  One of 
the ways that establishments attract customers is by appealing to sexuality: 
“[t]ake a close look around Las Vegas, for example, and count the number 
of new risqué nightclubs, tantalizing themed bars, and topless showgirl 
productions, all just a short distance from the casino floor.”86  Management 
                                                          
81.  Id. at 128. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Gregory J. Kamer & Edwin A. Keller Jr., Give me $5 Chips, A Jack and Coke — 
Hold the Cleavage: A Look at Employee Appearance Issues in the Gaming Industry, 7 
GAMING L. REV. 335 (2003). 
85.  Id. 
86.  Kamer & Keller, supra note 84, at 335. 
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often attempts to enhance the customer base of its casino “with scantily 
clad ‘Barbie doll’ cocktail servers, beefcake bartenders, and smartly 
dressed dealers with sex appeal and gregarious personalities.”87  Unfortu-
nately, management attempts to draw a bigger customer base by creating a 
“sexy image” of its operations becomes unlawful when such policies rely 
on stereotypes about female characteristics and abilities or notions of fe-
male attractiveness. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that customer preference is not 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for a policy that has a disparate im-
pact.88  A BFOQ must involve a business necessity, not merely a business 
convenience.  The language of Title VII suggests that “permissible distinc-
tions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job.”89  
To establish a legitimate BFOQ defense an employer must prove that: “(1) 
a direct relationship exists between an employee’s protected class and an 
employee’s ability to perform the duties of the job, such that members of 
the excluded class cannot perform the duties of the job; and (2) the required 
qualification goes to the ‘essence’ of the business operation.”90 
The first element requires the courts to ask what particular skills are in-
volved in an occupation.91 
 
In the context of cocktail servers, for example, an employer 
must demonstrate that a server’s sex and physical appearance are 
necessary for them to perform their work.  Assuming that cock-
tail servers must be able to serve drinks, carry heavy trays, walk 
long distances, and be friendly and courteous, their sex or age is 
not likely to be considered necessary to their ability to accepta-
bly perform their job.92 
 
However, the characterization of the job duties is essential.  Depending 
on how an employer characterizes the essence of the business, a BFOQ 
based upon appearance and sex may be successful.  The second element 
calls for the court to ask whether the qualification is sufficiently related to 
the essence of the business.93 
For example, in Playboy Club, Playboy successfully asserted that vi-
carious sexual entertainment was its primary service.94  The N.Y. Human 
                                                          
87.  Id. 
88.  Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 197, 201-06 (1991). 
89.  Id. at 204. 
90.  Kamer & Keller, supra note 84, at 340. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 340-341. 
93.  Id. at 341. 
94.  Id. (citing St. Cross v. Playboy Club of N.Y., Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 
22618-70 (N.Y. Human Rights App. Bd. 1971)). 
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Rights Appeals Board agreed.95  The court found that being female is a 
BFOQ for the position of being a Playboy Bunny because the dominant 
purpose of the job was characterized as being to “titillate and entice male 
customers,” thus being female was necessary to the essence of the busi-
ness.96 
However, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, the court rejected 
the BFOQ defense.97  Pan Am had a policy of restricting its hiring for flight 
attendants to females.98  When the company was sued by a male job appli-
cant who had been denied a flight position because of his sex, Pan Am de-
fended its policy by asserting the BFOQ defense.99  In denying Pan Am’s 
defense, the court held that being female was not a BFOQ for the job of 
flight cabin attendant and appellee’s refusal to hire appellant’s class solely 
because of their sex constituted a violation of Title VII.100 
The Playboy case is a straightforward illustration of when market justi-
fications act as legitimate causes for sex-based discrimination.  Similarly, 
the Pan Am. case is a typical example of a company’s reliance on customer 
preference for sex-based discrimination as violative of Title VII.  The 
above mentioned cases are rather straightforward and do not leave the 
courts much room to be deferential to employers.  However, when dis-
crimination occurs at a deeper level, one that is rooted in a perceived “natu-
ralness of the existing gender order,”101 courts tend to be more deferential 
to employers by accepting customer preference justifications. 
The case of Jespersen v. Harrah’s is a good example of a company 
policy that is so rooted in the notion of the “naturalness of the gendered or-
der” that courts may not recognize the discriminatory nature of the pro-
gram. 
According to the brief filed on Harrah’s behalf, the appearance re-
quirements imposed on employees under Harrah’s neutral “Personal Best” 
program constituted a legitimate exercise of managerial discretion.102  Al-
ternatively, the policy was not discriminatory because it qualified as a 
BFOQ.103  Harrah’s “Beverage Department Image Transformation” pro-
gram was implemented at twenty Harrah’s locations in February 2000 with 
                                                          
95.  Id. 
96.  Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971). 
97.  Id. at 388-889. 
98.  Id. at 386. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388-89. 
101.  Deborah L. Brake, Revisiting Title IX’s Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the 
Three Part-Test, 12 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y. & L. 453, 477 (2003). 
102.  See Appellee’s Answering Brief at 33–34, Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (No. 03-
15045), available at 2003 WL 22716702; see also, Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory 
Council as Amicus Curiae (2005), available at http://www.eeac.org/briefs/JespersenvHarrah 
s.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
103.  Id. 
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the goal of creating a brand standard of excellence.104 
Jespersen, on the other hand, argued that the company policy had noth-
ing to do with the “essence of the [beverage serving] business.”105  Accord-
ing to Harrah’s own rules the job qualifications included maintaining a 
courteous, professional relationship with customers and co-workers, as well 
as making drinks effectively and efficiently.106  The requirements of wear-
ing make-up cannot be said to be necessary to the job description.  In fact, 
Jespersen detailed how the wearing of make-up negatively affected her 
ability to perform her job: “[wearing make-up] prohibited me from doing 
my job.  I felt exposed.”107 
While courts justify policies such as Harrah’s as serving legitimate 
business interests, (including: health and safety reasons,108 projecting a pro-
fessional image when representing the company and its interests,109 and 
promoting a productive work environment), such discriminatory policies 
cannot be defensible under the guise of legitimate market justification con-
cerns.  By continuing to be deferential to company policies mandating sex-
ual discrimination,110 courts undermine Title VII’s prohibitions on sex 
based discrimination. 
C.   BENIGN “COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS” OR UNLAWFUL “GENDER 
STEREOTYPING”? 
The case of Ann Hopkins in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse is illustrative 
of unlawful gender stereotyping.111  In her fifth year with Price Water-
house, Hopkins applied for partnership but was told her candidacy would 
not be considered.112  She resigned and then sued the firm for sex discrimi-
nation.113  Critical to her case were numerous comments by male partners at 
Price Waterhouse, describing Hopkins as “macho,” remarking she “over-
compensated for being a woman,” and suggesting her chances for partner-
ship would improve if she would “walk more femininely, talk more femin-
                                                          
104.  Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077. 
105.  See Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 33-34, Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (No. 
03-15045), available at 2003 WL 22716697. 
106.  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 
107.  GenderPAC Interviews Darlene Jespersen on Gender, Being Fired, and Sex 
Stereotyping in the Workplace, supra note 72. 
108.  See Bhatia v. Chevron USA, Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
safety concerns justified company policy of requiring all employees to be clean-shaven, 
where the policy was based on the necessity of being able to wear a respirator with a gas-
tight face seal because of potential exposure to toxic gases). 
109.  See Wislocki-Goin, 831 F.2d 1374 (holding that a policy adopted out of legiti-
mate concern for public confidence in professionalism of government employees does not 
violate Title VII); see also Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. at 1392 (affirm-
ing that the “decision to project a certain image as one aspect of company policy is the em-
ployer’s prerogative”). 
110.  See, e.g., Tavora, 101 F.3d at 907. 
111.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
112.  Id. at 228. 
113.  Id. 
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inely, wear make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry.”114 
Furthermore, the American Psychological Association (hereinafter 
APA) submitted an amicus brief in support of Hopkins position.115  The 
brief argued that: 
 
(1)  empirical research on sex stereotyping has been conducted 
over many decades and is commonly accepted in the scientific commu-
nity; 
(2)  stereotyping under certain conditions can create discriminatory 
consequences for stereotyped groups;116 
(3)  the conditions that promote stereotyping were present in peti-
tioner’s work environment; and  
(4)  although defendant was found to have taken no successful 
steps to prevent its discriminatory stereotyping of plaintiff, methods are 
available to monitor and diminish the effects of stereotyping.117 
 
The Court agreed with Hopkins and the APA, finding impermissible 
gender stereotyping.118  Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan wrote that: 
 
we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereo-
type associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers 
to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress 
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women.’119 
 
The Court held that the company impermissibly imposed sex-
differentiated appearance standards on male and female employees and 
awarded Hopkins partnership status with compensation at the level of those 
partners promoted at the time of her candidacy, back pay with interest, and 
an injunction against retaliation.120 
While the Price Waterhouse decision seems to bar the use of all sexual 
stereotypes in employment decisions, in practice the decision has been er-
ratically applied.  For example, in Jespersen the Ninth Circuit Court re-
fused to apply the Price Waterhouse standard, reasoning that gender-
                                                          
114.  Id. at 235. 
115.  Law and Psychology: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, American Psychological As-
sociation, available at http://www.apa.org/psyclaw/price.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
116.  For example, where stereotypes shape perceptions about women’s typical and ac-
ceptable roles in society, and that negative effects on women in work settings have been 
demonstrated.  See, e.g., BORDO, supra note 75. 
117.  Law and Psychology: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra note 115. 
118.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
119.  Id. at 251. 
120.  Id. at 252. 
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stereotyping sexual harassment is distinct from gender-specific appearance 
standards.121  Similarly in Tavora, the court found that a company policy 
that required male employees but not female employees to wear short hair 
does not violate Title VII.122  The court reasoned that Title VII does not 
render illegal all employment policies that treat men and women differ-
ently, no matter how trivial.123  Instead, the court stated that the company’s  
neutral policy was not discriminatory simply because it imposed differen-
tial standards based on community expectations.124 
While Price Waterhouse has been successfully applied in cases where 
the stereotypical notions of gender have resulted in harassment from other 
employees, courts are consistently failing to apply the Price Waterhouse 
standard in “neutral” employer dress codes.125 
 
[I]n dress code cases, courts typically refuse to see the “dis-
crimination” at all, as long as both men and women are prohibited 
from “crossing over” to the gender presentation deemed suitable 
for the other sex.  These cases reflect an implicit judgment that 
employers should not be forced to bear the costs of challenging 
certain cultural expectations about gender.126 
 
Legal scholars and feminists fault the courts’ holdings on an assump-
tion that such dress codes, because they force employees to conform to cer-
tain societal notions of masculinity and femininity, are neutral and thus 
harmless.  The courts cannot assume that legal actors come to law as un-
gendered beings.  Such presumptions are “preposterous” because “our so-
ciety remains gendered in significant ways.”127 
Because gender inequality pervades the way we think, courts must be 
especially sensitive when defining appearance based policies as “neutral.”  
When courts leave disparate employer practices in place, they are reinforc-
ing the oppressive social systems in place. 
 
To feminists, law both reflects and creates oppressive social 
systems. Law contributes to our basic understanding of what is 
real and what is not. Law does this primarily through its ‘expres-
sive function’: the messages that the law sends about the kind of 
                                                          
121.  Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
122.  See, e.g., Tavora, 101 F.3d at 907. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. at 908. 
125.  Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1117 (accepting the argument that the only way to be “gender 
neutral” is to adopt disparate rules that reflect “the standard of what the community expects 
of each sex, respectively”). 
126.  Brake, supra note 101, at 476. 
127.  BOTTOMLEY, supra note 80, at 14. 
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people we are and the institutions that we value.128 
 
Recognizing that the laws were constructed overwhelmingly by Anglo-
men, who may (and do) have a different understanding of “what is real and 
what is not” to working women, is essential to transforming the laws sur-
rounding appearance and grooming standards. 
University of Michigan Law Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon de-
fines sexual harassment of working women as “the unwanted imposition of 
sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.”129  
While appearance and grooming standards generally do not fall within the 
purview of sexual harassment analysis, the dynamics MacKinnon describes 
are valuable for understanding the effect of such “neutral policies” on 
women.  A company policy, written by management, outlining the details 
of how women must dress, act, and look is a powerful expression of domi-
nance.  For women such as Jespersen it is an unwanted imposition of a sex-
ual requirement in the context of a relationship of unequal power.  While 
having to wear make-up and stockings may not appear to a judge to be a 
sexual requirement, in reality, such “gender neutral” policies have real and 
long-term implications about how women are perceived in the working 
world. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MODEL 
Currently, the District of Columbia is at the forefront of appearance 
based discrimination legislation.  Its statute explicitly includes a prohibition 
against appearance based discrimination. The District has enacted the fol-
lowing antidiscrimination ordinance: 
 
It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia, in 
enacting this chapter, to secure an end in the District of Colum-
bia to discrimination for any reason other than that of individual 
merit, including, but not limited to, discrimination by reason of 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, per-
sonal appearance, sexual orientation, familial status, family re-
sponsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, disability, 
source of income, and place of residence or business.130 
 
The City’s Code defines ‘“personal appearance” as: 
 
                                                          
128.  Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law?, 28 SW. U. L. 
REV. 171, 179-80 (1999). 
129.  RAYMOND F. GREGORY, UNWELCOME AND UNLAWFUL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 1 (Cornell University Press 2004); (quoting CATHERINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, (Yale University Press, 1979)). 
130.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.01 (2001). 
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[T]he outward appearance of any person, irrespective of sex, 
with regard to bodily condition or characteristics, manner or 
style of dress, and manner or style of personal grooming, includ-
ing, but not limited to, hair style and beards. It shall not relate, 
however, to the requirement of cleanliness, uniforms, or pre-
scribed standards, when uniformly applied for admittance to a 
public accommodation, or when uniformly applied to a class of 
employees for a reasonable business purpose; or when such bod-
ily conditions or characteristics, style or manner of dress or per-
sonal grooming presents a danger to the health, welfare or safety 
of any individual.131 
 
The District of Columbia applies its antidiscrimination laws, including 
the prohibition of “personal appearance” discrimination, via the following, 
broad statement of law: 
 
Every individual shall have an equal opportunity to partici-
pate fully in the economic, cultural and intellectual life of the 
District and to have an equal opportunity to participate in all as-
pects of life, including, but not limited to, in employment, in 
places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, in educa-
tional institutions, in public service, and in housing and commer-
cial space accommodations.132 
 
The benefit of state and local appearance discrimination employment 
statutes has begun to be recognized by scholars and localities nationwide.133  
“Employers would be encouraged to hire applicants based solely on legiti-
mate qualifications and business concerns, instead of on stereotypical and 
unfounded assumptions.”134  Furthermore, these laws would give individu-
als harmed by unfounded stereotyping a mechanism for change: “an avenue 
of relief should also exist for individuals who face and endure real and 
damaging discrimination based on their outward appearance.”135 
Most applicants and employees receive inadequate protection from ap-
pearance discrimination.  Although some appearance claims might fall 
within the scope of Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, the vast majority of 
appearance discrimination claims are not actionable.  Furthermore, even 
where a connection to a protected category can be argued, many claims 
likely will fail because courts will characterize these claims as discrimina-
tion based on appearance, as opposed to a characteristic related to the exist-
                                                          
131.  Id. at § 2-1401.02. 
132.  Id. at § 2-1402.01. 
133.  Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance 
Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 212 (2000). 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
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ing category. 
Like Adamitis, I argue that appearance discrimination victims should 
not be limited to existing laws.136  Instead, I urge local municipalities and 
state governments to amend their legislation to include prohibitions against 
appearance based discrimination.  Doing so will ensure that employers will 
no longer use Title VII’s language and the courts’ deference to reinforce 
“harmless” or “neutral” sexual stereotypes.  Instead, legislation modeled 
after the District’s ordinance would encourage employers to avoid creating 
policies and making employment decisions that involve forcing employees 
to conform to damaging gender stereotypes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
RASKIN - FOR CHRISTENSEN 4/12/2006  9:47 AM 
268 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17.2 
 
* * * 
